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ABSTRACT 
 
Thwarting Successful Piracy. (May 2012) 
 
Arielle D. Carchidi 
Department of Maritime Studies 
Texas A&M University at Galveston 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Joan Mileski 
Department of Maritime Administration 
 
In recent years, maritime piracy has received more attention from governments, the 
maritime industry, and the media.  Increased incidents of violent attacks, particularly in 
the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, create hazards for seafarers and shipping companies.  
The maritime industry has issued “Best Management Practices for Protection against 
Somalia Based Piracy (“BMP4”); however, not all practices are implemented, often to 
the detriment of the vessel under attack.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to identify what prevents an attack from being successful.  
Using data from the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Center and the 
Sea-Web shipping database, I have compiled a list of vessel characteristics, defense and 
deterrence strategies with particular emphasis on BMP4, and cooperation with other 
companies or governments for each reported attack occurring between 2006 and 2011.  
From this list, we tested which of these variables have a relationship to the success or 
failure of an attack.  Our study concluded that defense and cooperative strategies help 
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prevent negative outcomes in general.  Deterrence strategies are shown to help prevent 
hostages being taken, while defense strategies appear to reduce the need for a shipping 
company to pay a ransom.  The industry supported best practices are shown to reduce 
the risk of property being stolen and hostages being taken.  
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BMP4 Best Management Practices, 4
th
 Edition 
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IMB International Maritime Bureau 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
ISPS International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Though piracy and armed robbery at sea has been a problem for maritime commerce for 
centuries, these attacks have increased both in frequency and violence in recent years.  
Waters of particular concern include the Strait of Malacca, the Niger Delta of Nigeria, 
off the coast of Somalia, and the northeast coast of South America [1].  More than ninety 
percent of world trade is maritime based [2], meaning that the maritime industry is 
especially important to the world economy.  Piracy results in costly outcomes for 
shipping companies including increased insurance premiums, purchasing new security 
technology, replacing cargo, paying ransoms, rerouting vessels, and potentially hiring 
protective forces [3].  Also of concern is the safety of the seafarers in these dangerous 
waters.   
 
Because pirates are looking to maximize the return on their attacks [4], certain vessels 
are targeted more than others because of perceived vulnerability.  The vulnerability of a 
ship may be determined by the vessel’s classification, speed, freeboard, and voyage [5].  
Other factors incorporated into the study include the vessel’s age, flag, and composition 
of crew.   
_______________ 
This thesis follows the style of Maritime Policy & Management. 
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Because global naval forces are insufficient to protect and patrol all the areas considered 
“high-risk”, shipping companies have been responsible for implementing their own 
strategies to reduce the risk to the crew, the ship, and the cargo [4].  To advise shipping 
companies on such strategies, the maritime industry has developed and published Best 
Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy, 4
th
 Edition 
(“BMP4”).  However, the guidelines can be effective in other waters, not just around 
Somalia.   These practices include enhanced vigilance, access control, high pressure fire 
hoses, additional lighting, and physical barriers including razor wire, alarms, and guards 
[6].  Though BMP4 is readily available, only about forty-eight percent of vessels follow 
these practices [5].   
 
This study evaluates the relationships between vessel characteristics, adherence to 
BMP4, and the success rate of pirate attacks.     
 
What is considered piracy? 
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), piracy consists 
of: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship 
or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship, or against persons or 
property on board such ship; 
(ii) against a ship, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State [7]. 
  3 
  
2
3
 
Piracy attacks can include armed robbery, hijacking, kidnapping, and demanding ransom 
for crew or property of a ship, including the ship itself [8].  Furthermore, under the 
Convention of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA Convention), seizure or damage to maritime property, injury, death 
and related matters can be considered piracy offences [9]. 
 
What is a successful thwart of a pirate attack? 
A pirate attack can be considered successful if it results in gains such as stolen property 
or receiving a ransom payment [4].  A successful thwart prevents pirates from obtaining 
their goals and includes protecting the lives of crewmembers and ship property.  It can 
also include capturing the pirates.   
 
Factors affecting pirate attacks 
These factors have been researched a potential determinants of piracy attacks and may 
also determine whether an attack can be successfully thwarted [4]. 
1. Region.  The location of an attack often will determine the type of attack [8].  For 
example, attacks in Asia tend to be theft of ship property, while attacks off of 
Somalia can involve holding the crew and ship for ransom.  Also, politics of the 
region can determine to what extent the waters are patrolled and whether the 
pirates are prosecuted [4].  Therefore, the effectiveness of certain piracy 
prevention strategies may work differently according to the region. 
 
2. Movement/non-movement of the ship.  Tactics for both the pirates and the crew 
will be different depending on whether a ship is anchored, berthed, or steaming. 
 
3. Type of ship.  Some vessels are considered more valuable or easier to take than 
others.   
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4. Size of ship.  The size of a vessel can determine its vulnerability to attack.  Ships 
with low freeboard, the distance between the waterline and the vessel’s deck, are 
considered easier targets for pirates.   
 
5. Age of ship.  It can be difficult to retrofit a ship with the new technologies and 
security systems after the ship is built, so the age of a ship may impact the 
success of a pirate attack [4].   
 
6. Flag of ship.  The flag of a ship determines the legal and political response for a 
ship if an incident occurs including military response and safety standards [4]. 
 
7. Size of crew.  Smaller crews can make it easier for pirates to successfully attack 
a ship [8].  Strategies to thwart pirate attacks will be impacted by the number of 
crewmembers on board and when companies support certain implementations, 
they should keep in mind any deficiencies in crew numbers to maintain the 
highest level of security.  This control variable was later dropped from the study 
because information regarding crew size was not available for all the vessels 
included.  
 
8. Number of pirates.  As with the size of crew, the number of pirates may 
determine how effective an attack is.  It might be easier for a larger number of 
pirates to overcome a ship and its crew.  Further, effectiveness of the tactics for 
both the pirates and the crew will depend upon this number.  As with crew size, 
this variable was later dropped from the study as the number of pirates was not 
included in all reports. 
 
9. Strategies used by the crew.  Often, it is what the crew does to prevent an attack 
that determines how successful an attempt may be.  The crew can adopt defense, 
deterrence, and cooperative strategies.  As mentioned previously, BMP4 outlines 
the best practices believed to be effective in protecting a vessel and its crew.  
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
 
For this study, the success of piracy was analyzed by using each reported pirate attack 
and attempted attack occurring between 2006 and 2011.  Details regarding the victim 
vessel and the attack are obtained through use of published reports from the International 
Maritime Bureau and the online shipping database Sea-web. 
 
Independent variables include defense strategies, deterrence strategies, and cooperative 
strategies as determined by industry adopted best management practices.   Dependent 
variables are the potential outcomes of an attack.  The control variables in the study 
include region, movement/non-movement of a ship, type of ship, size of ship, age of 
ship, flag of ship, type of attack, size of crew, type of cargo, and number of pirates.  
These variables are used to determine what factors into a successful pirate attack and 
how these attacks might be thwarted. 
   
Data sources 
The International Maritime Bureau  
“The International Chamber of Commerce-International Maritime bureau 
(IMB) was established in 1981 to act as a focal point in the fight against all 
types of maritime fraud, malpractice, and piracy.  The United Nations (UN) 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) in its resolution A 504 (XII)(9) 
adopted on 20 November 1981, has among other things urged all governments, 
interests and organization to exchange information and provide appropriate 
cooperation with the IMB.  The IMB also has observer status with the  
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IMO.” [10] 
 
Companies are encouraged to report incidents involving piracy or attempted attacks to 
the IMB Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) through use of a 24-hour maritime security 
hotline.  This information is published in an annual “Piracy & Armed Robbery Attack 
Report” and is shared publicly online to assist mariners in detecting threats of piracy. 
 
Since the data are self-reported and voluntary, some incidents are not available through 
this source.  It is estimated by the deputy director of the IMB, Michael Howlett, that 
70% of all piracy incidents are actually reported to the IMB [11].  Though information is 
not available for all attacks, these reports from the PRC are the most comprehensive 
dataset on maritime piracy available for the industry. 
 
For this study, data available from January 1, 2006 to June 30, 2011 is used for analysis.  
The reports provided information for each reported attack including vessel location, 
movement status and flag, as well as the number of pirates involved in the attack and 
type of attack.  Also used is the published details of the attack including the outcome of 
the reported incidents. 
   
Sea-web 
Sea-web is a commercial database developed and maintained by IHS Fairplay (IHS 
Global Limited). It has information about 179,000 ships of 100 gross tons and above.  
The dataset also contains records for over 200,000 companies [12]. 
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“IHS Fairplay manages the IMO (International Maritime Organization) Ship 
and Company Numbering Schemes on behalf of the IMO, providing unique 
identifiers for ships and shipowners.  As the originating sole source of assigning 
and validating these numbers, IHS Fairplay is able to guarantee an unmatched 
level of comprehensiveness in its datasets.” [12] 
 
The Sea-web database was used to obtain information regarding vessel type, tonnage, 
age, cargo, and crew capacity.  
 
Independent variables 
The independent variables represent the vessel’s defense strategies, deterrence strategies, 
and cooperative strategies to prevent the attack from being successful.  These include the 
recommended actions from the best management practices of the maritime industry.  
These are measured by a dummy variable (1/0), depending on whether or not a particular 
course of action was followed.  
 
Defense strategies include any defensive action taken when a vessel is under attack.  
These are listed as “returning fire”, “firing warning shots”, “activating fire hoses”, 
“retreating to a safe location”, “confronting pirates”, and “enforcing anti-piracy 
measures”.  
 
Deterrence strategies include any action to deter an attack from occurring.  These are 
listed as “sounding alarm, whistle, or horn”, “shouting”, “mustering crew”, “increasing 
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the watch”, “redirecting lights”, “engaging in evasive maneuvers”, “increasing speed”, 
“using barbed wire”, “using locking entrances”. 
 
Cooperative strategies indicated the vessel obtained help from an outside source.  These 
strategies are listed as “alerting authority”, “contacting naval or coast guard forces”, 
“alerting other ships”, “sending mayday/distress messages”, “authorities capturing 
pirates”, “authorities rescuing crew”, and “firing warning flares”. 
 
Best practices indicated that in either in using the defense, deterrence, or cooperative 
strategies, the vessel had adhered to BMP4. 
   
Dependent variables 
The dependent variable evaluates the success of the pirate attack.  These include whether 
any bad outcome occurred (“outcome”), if hostages were taken (“hostages”), property 
was stolen (“stolen”), ransom was paid (“ransom”), or pirates successfully escape 
(“escape”).  Dummy variables (1/0) indicate the incident of each of these possible 
outcomes occurred as reported to the IMB PRC.  Information on all possible outcomes, 
particularly regarding ransom payment, is not available for all incidents. 
 
Control variables 
The following variables represent other factors which may affect the success of a pirate 
attack and all are expressed by a dummy variable (1/0) based on its occurrence: 
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1. Region is operationalized by nine regional options, representing the location of 
the attack.  The regions are “Malacca”, “Southeast Asia- Not Malacca”, “Far 
East”, “Indian Subcontinent”, “Americas”, “Somalia”, “Gulf of Aden/Red Sea”, 
“Africa- Not Somalia”, and “Other”. 
 
2. Movement/Non-movement of the ship is operationalized by three status options, 
representing the movement of the ship at the time of the attack.  The status 
options are “steaming”, “anchored”, or “berthed”. 
 
3. Type of Ship is operationalized by seventeen ship options representing the type 
of ship that was attacked.  The ship types are “barge”, “bulk carrier”, “chemical 
tanker”, “container”, “fishing vessels”, “general cargo”, “LNG tanker”, 
“passenger ship”, “product tanker”, “refrigerated cargo”, “research vessel”, “ro-
ro vessel”, “supply ship”, “tanker”, “tug”, “vehicle carrier”, “yacht”, and “other”. 
 
4. Size of Ship is operationalized by the gross tonnage of the vessel attacked. 
 
5. Age of Ship is operationalized by subtracting the year the ship was built as 
reported by the Sea-web database from the year of the reported attack. 
 
6. Flag of Ship is operationalized by eighty-three flag options of ships reporting 
attacks during the period of study.  These flags are listed as “Algeria”, “Antigua 
and Barbuda”, “Argentina”, “Austria”, “Bahamas”, “Bahrain”, “Bangladesh”, 
“Barbados”, “Belgium”, “Belize”, “Bermuda”, “Brazil”, “Bulgaria”, “Canary 
Islands”, “Cayman Islands”, “China”, “Comoros”, “Croatia”, “Cyprus”, 
“Denmark”, “Dominica”, “Ecuador”, “Egypt”, “Ethiopia”, “France”, “Germany”, 
“Gibraltar”, “Greece”, “Honduras”, “Hong Kong”, “India”, “Indonesia”, “Iran”, 
“Isle of Mann”, “Italy”, “Jamaica”, “Japan”, “Jordan”, “Kenya”, “Kiribati”, 
“Kuwait”, “Liberia”, “Libya”, “Lithuania”, “Luxembourg”, “Malaysia”, “Malta”, 
“Marshall Islands”, “Mongolia”, “Mozambique”, “Netherlands Antilles”, 
“Nigeria”, “North Korea”, “Norway”, “Pakistan”, “Panama”, “Philippines”, 
“Portugal”, “Qatar”, “Russia”, “Saudi Arabia”, “Seychelles”, “Sierra Leone”, 
“Singapore”, “South Africa”, “South Korea”, “Spain”, “St. Kitt/Nevis”, “St. 
Vincent and Grenadines”, “Switzerland”, “Taiwan”, “Tanzania”, “Thailand”, 
“Togo”, “Turkey”, “Tuvalu”, “UAE”, “UK”, “Ukraine”, “USA”, “Vanuatu”, 
“Vietnam”, and “Yemen”. 
 
7. Type of Attack is operationalized by four options, indicating whether the vessel 
was “boarded”, “fired upon”, “hijacked”, or if the attack was “attempted”.  
 
8. Size of Crew is operationalized by using the crew capacity as listed on the Sea-
web database.  Information regarding size of crew is not available for all vessels, 
and these details are a general statement and may not actually reflect the size of 
the crew during the reported incident. 
  10 
  
2
3
 
 
9. Type of Cargo is operationalized by twelve cargo options, representing what the 
vessel was carrying at the time of the attack.  The type of cargo is listed as 
“bale”, “chemicals”, “containers”, “grain”, “liquid product”, “LPG”, “oil”, 
“passengers”, “vehicles”, “other cargo”, “multiple cargoes”, and “no cargo”. 
 
10. Number of Pirates is operationalized by the number of pirates in the reports given 
to the IMB PRC. 
 
Data analysis 
All values are expressed as means+ or – SEM or percentages.  Each of the variables was 
tested for differences between attacks and attempted attacks with and without a bad 
outcome by univariate statistical methodology with significance accepted at p < 0.1 (chi-
square).   Data were evaluated using a combination of chi-square analysis and logistic 
regression analysis [4].  A pooled cross-sectional multivariate logistic regression 
analysis was used to test the hypotheses that the three strategies of defense, deterrence 
and cooperative security affect the probability of an unsuccessful pirate attack by using 
the statistical analysis system package (SAS).  Because the independent variable “best 
practice” was collinear with “defense” and “deterrence”, a subsequent analysis was 
completed to test the effectiveness of the published best practices.  For this analysis the 
dependent variable was the outcome of either hostages being taken, ransom being paid, 
property being stolen, or successful escape by the pirates.   
 
Specifically, the model estimated was  
 
Log(pi/1-pi) = log Oi = alpha + Bi(Df) + Bi(Dt) + Bi(COOP) + C +E 
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Where log Oi is the log odds of a bad piracy attack outcome, Bi(Df) is the vector of the 
defense strategies, Bi(Dt) is the vector of the deterrence strategies, Bi(COOP) is the 
vector of the cooperative strategies, C is the control variable and E is the error term. To 
determine significance of each variable, the chi-square probability (p) value, which 
within multiple logistic regressions corresponds to a standard probability value, was 
calculated for all variables in an analysis within their assigned category, and significance 
was accepted at p < 0.1. This chi-square probability value is reported in the tables for 
each independent variable in addition to the probability value from standard univariate 
analysis [4].  
 
In conjunction with the above models, nested models based on sequential addition of 
significant variables along each additional time course were determined. This was 
performed by adding significant independent variables to subsequent models.  Further 
analyses lead to models containing only the significant variables described in the 
regression equations.  When variables were collinear, the strongest reasonable variable 
was retained.  These include the values for “anchor”, “steaming”, “boarded”.  Because 
ship classification was found to be collinear with type of cargo, the latter variable was 
not used. Tonnage was eliminated because it is directly related to vessel type and cargo 
and demonstrated collinearity. The variables of the vessels under the flags of Argentina, 
Brazil, Ecuador, Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania were also eliminated due to 
the minimal amount of attacks occurring on these vessels.  The variables for “crew size” 
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and “number of pirates” were also discarded because this information was not available 
for the majority of vessels in the IMB reports. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
Model A 
Independent variables 
The three independent variables “defense”, “deterrence”, and “cooperation” are 
individually tested against the five dependent variables and relationship significance is 
determined at the p < .1 level.  For the dependent variable “outcome”, the independent 
variables “defense” and “cooperation” are found significant.  For the dependent variable 
“hostages”, only “deterrence” is found significant.  For the dependent variable “paid”, 
only the independent variable “defense” is found significant.  No independent variable is 
found significant for the dependent variables “stolen” or “escape”. 
 
Control variables 
The nine region variables are tested individually against the five dependent variables and 
significance was determined at the p < .1 level.  For the dependent variable “outcome”, t 
region variables “Southeast Asia”, “Americas”, and “Africa” are found significant.  For 
the dependent variable “hostages”, only the variable “Indian” is found significant.  Only 
the region variable “Somalia” is found significant for “stolen”.  No region variables are 
found significant for the dependent variables “paid” and “escape”. 
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The ship type variables were tested individually with the five dependent variables and 
significance was determined at the p < .1 level.  For the dependent variable “stolen”, 
three ship types are determined to have significance, “LPG”, “tanker”, and “tug”.  Ship 
classification is not found significant for any other dependent variable. 
 
The only movement variable tested against the five dependent variables was “berthed”.  
“Berthed” was found to be significant at the p < .1 level with only the dependent variable 
“hostages”.  The age of the ship is tested individually against the five dependent 
variables.  At the p < .10 level of significance, the age of the ship is found significant for 
the dependent variables “outcome” and “escape”. 
 
The flag variables are tested individually with the five dependent variables.  Significance 
was determined at the p < .1 level.  For the dependent variable “outcome”, the flag 
variable “Netherlands” is found significant.  For the dependent variable “hostages”, the 
flag variables “Italy” and “St. Vincent” are found to be significant.  For the dependent 
variable “stolen”, the flag variable “Denmark” is found to be significant.  No flag 
variable is found to be significant with the dependent variables “paid” or “escape”. 
 
The types of attack are tested individually with the five dependent variables and 
significance is determined at the p < .1 level.  For the dependent variable “outcome”, the 
attack variables “attempted” and “fired” are found to be significant.  The attack variable 
“hijack” is found to be significant with the dependent variables “hostages”, “stolen”, and 
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“paid”.  Type of attack is not found to be significant with the dependent variable 
“escape”. 
 
Table 1.  Results for variables from Model A demonstrating significance at the 
            p < .1 level 
Dependent     Independent/             Estimate     Pr > Ch   Sq 
Variable     Control Variable            Estimate                Pr > ChiSq 
Outcome     Defense             -1.4087      0.0220 
      Cooperation             -1.8199      0.0010 
 
      Attempt               2.1905      0.0189 
      Fired Upon               1.9629      0.0266 
      Built    0.0591      0.0048 
      Netherlands              -3.3671      0.0728 
      Southeast Asia  2.6381      0.0663 
      Americas   3.8318      0.0305 
      Africa   4.0188      0.0135 
 
Hostages     Deterrence             -0.6972      0.0008 
      
   Berthed             -0.7318      0.0528 
   Hijacked      3.1382     < .0001 
   Italy              -2.7739      0.0478 
   St. Vincent             -2.1507      0.0489 
   Indian Ocean                         -2.1708      0.0104 
 
Stolen      Hijacked   1.6455      0.0043 
      LPG    1.9978      0.0184 
     Tanker               0.9389      0.0938 
     Tug     1.6225      0.0113 
     Denmark   2.3375      0.0655 
     Somalia              -3.3482      0.0078 
 
Paid     Defense              -2.9602      0.0080 
 
     Hijacked   4.0282      0.0001 
 
Escape     Built    0.7542      0.0791 
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Analysis 
Table 1 shows the independent and control variables that have a significant relationship 
with the dependent variables at the p < .1 level (for full results of statistical analysis for 
Model A, see Table A-1).  Those variables with a positive estimate value are the ones 
which are shown to be more likely to produce the undesirable outcomes that the 
dependent variables represent.  The variables which have been deemed significant but 
have a negative estimate value are the variables which can reduce the likelihood of a bad 
outcome. 
 
Independent variables 
Adopting defense and cooperation strategies seem to be the most effective at preventing 
a bad outcome in general.  Deterrence strategies are the most effective at preventing 
pirates from taking crewmembers hostage.  To prevent a hostage situation that results in 
ransom being demanded and paid, a ship should adopt defense strategies.  No 
independent variable stood out to prevent property from being stolen or pirates from 
escaping the scene of the crime. 
 
Control variables 
Older vessels and vessels in the regions of Southeastern Asia, the Americas, and Africa 
appear to have a higher chance of a negative outcome if attacked by pirates.  Also, when 
an attack is attempted or a vessel is fired upon, it likely that a negative outcome will 
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occur.  However, ships under a flag from the Netherlands have a lower chance of 
encountering a bad outcome.  
 
Hostages are more likely to be taken on vessels that have been hijacked.  These hijack 
vessels also are the most likely to result in ransom being paid for the release of the ship 
and its crew.  However, vessels that are berthed during the time of attack, have a flag 
from either Italy or St. Vincent, or are traversing the Indian Ocean region are less likely 
to have crewmembers taken hostage.   
 
Tankers, tugs, and LPG tankers appear to be the types of ships that are more susceptible 
to property being stolen, as well as flags under a Danish flag.  The significance between 
hijacked vessels and stolen property is likely because these vessels are considered stolen 
property in this study.  Interestingly, though hijacked vessels are considered stolen 
property, ships traversing Somali waters are less likely to be theft victims. 
  
Other than age of a vessel, no other control variable seems to prevent a pirates being able 
to successful escape.  The older the vessel, the easier it appears for the pirates to get 
away. 
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Model B 
Independent variables 
As mentioned above, “best practices” was found to be collinear with “defense” and 
“deterrence”, requiring a separate test to test the effectiveness of industry-supported best 
practices.  The independent variables “cooperation” and “best practices” are 
independently tested against the five dependent variables.  Significance is determined at 
the p < .1 level.  “Cooperation” is found to be significant with the dependent variable 
“outcome”.  “Best practices” is found to be significant with the dependent variables 
“hostages” and “stolen”. 
 
Control variables 
When the model is completed again using only “best practices” and “cooperation” as 
dependent variables, the significance of the control variables, as determined at the p <.10 
level, remains largely unchanged from that determined in Model A.  However, there are 
minor changes in the results.  For the dependent variable “outcome”, the flag variable 
“Netherlands” is no longer found significant, but the ship classification variable 
“supply” is.  The ship classification variable “tanker” is no longer found significant for 
the dependent variable “stolen”.  For the dependent variable “escape”, the age variable 
“built” has lost its significance.  
 
Table 2, as in Table one, displays the relationships between the dependent variables and 
the independent and control variables considered significant at the p < .1 level (for full 
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results of statistical analysis for Model B, see Table A-2).   Those variables with a 
positive estimate value are the ones which are shown to be more likely to produce the 
undesirable outcomes that the dependent variables represent.  The variables which have 
been deemed significant but have a negative estimate value are the variables which can 
reduce the likelihood of a bad outcome. 
 
Table 2.  Results for variables from Model B demonstrating significance at the 
            p < .1 level 
Dependent     Independent/             Estimate     Pr > Ch   Sq 
Variable     Control Variable            Estimate                Pr > ChiSq 
Outcome     Cooperation             -2.1430      0.0002 
 
      Attempt               2.3026      0.0135 
      Fired Upon               1.9932      0.0225 
      Supply                       -6.2978      0.0304 
      Built                0.0540      0.0053 
      Southeast Asia                            2.8370      0.0526 
      Americas               3.6793      0.0340 
      Africa                4.1288      0.0122 
 
Hostages     Best Practices                        - 0.7533      0.0002 
 
      Berthed             - 0.7328      0.0523 
      Hijacked                                      3.1086     < .0001 
      Italy              -2.7922      0.0481 
      St. Vincent             -2.2097      0.0470 
      Indian Ocean                          -2.2229      0.0086 
 
Stolen      Best Practices                         -1.3963     < .0001 
 
      Hijacked               1.5380      0.0054 
      LPG               1.8671      0.0278 
      Supply                          -2.2395      0.0784 
      Tanker                           0.8714      0.0107 
      Denmark              2.1125      0.0939 
      Somalia             -3.1751      0.0099 
      Aden              -2.5105      0.0474 
 
 
Paid     Hijacked              3.9646     < .0001  
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Analysis 
Independent variables 
In Model B, which considered the effectiveness of best practices and cooperative 
strategies, cooperation continued to be method most likely to prevent a bad outcome in 
general.  The industry adopted best practices appear to have a positive effect in 
preventing hostages being taken and property being stolen.  Best practices and 
cooperation seem to have no impact on whether a ransom is paid or if the pirates 
successfully escape.  
 
Control variables 
Model B shows that supply ships, in addition to the control variables from Model A, are 
less likely to have a bad outcome if attacked.  There is no change in the significance of 
control variables from Model A and the probability of hostages being taken and age of 
ship no longer influences whether or not the pirates escape.  This model also shows that 
supply ships and vessels in the Gulf of Aden or Somali waters are less likely to be 
victims of theft, and tankers are no longer considered as at-risk as shown in Model A.    
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Preventing an attack from being successful requires a company to be proactive and a 
crew to be alert and trained how to react in the event an incident occurs.  This study is a 
comprehensive evaluation of the defense, deterrence, and cooperative strategies that 
have been used in incidents reported to the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Center.  The results 
validate the need for vessels to remain vigilant in their operations.   
 
Piracy will continue to be a problem for the shipping industry; however, it is important 
for shipping companies to take precaution in order to safeguard the ship, its crew, and its 
cargo [5].  Industry developed BMP4, though initially developed to protect ships from 
Somali piracy, can be applied to maritime commerce in all regions susceptible to piracy.  
These best practices have been statistically shown to help prevent pirates from taking 
hostages and stealing property.  Though not all recommendations are appropriate for all 
vessels in all situations, companies should consider implementing the practices that are 
applicable to them [6].   
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A-1. Complete results for all variables from Model A  
 
              Outcome_____             Hostages_____                Stolen______         Ransom Paid____              Escape______                 
Independent/ 
Control Variable  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq   Estimate      Pr > ChiSq  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq   Estimate      Pr > ChiSq  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq 
Defense  - 1.4087         0.0220 - 0.4449       0.1816  - 0.8260        0.0029  - 2.9602       0.0080  - 2.4799       0.7423 
Deterrence    0.1546         0.7818 - 0.6972       0.0008  - 1.6127        <.0001  - 1.3123       1.3223    3.6575       0.3581 
Cooperation - 1.8199         0.0010 - 0.1437       0.4646    0.1151        0.5491    1.3980       0.1058    0         
 
Berthed  - 0.8893         0.3547 - 0.7318       0.0528  - 0.3308        0.3039  - 7.8578       0.7692  12.8260       0.6961 
Attempted   2.1905         0.0189            -16.9850       0.8481 -24.9203        0.8859 -14.7188       0.2966    7.5892       0.8667 
Fired Upon   1.9629         0.0266            -18.7234       0.8410 -23.9540        0.8964 -13.2484       0.3747  11.2349       0.9407 
Hijacked  - 1.2737         0.1367    3.1382       < .0001    1.6455        0.0043    4.0282       0.0001  11.4052       0.9475 
Barge  12.8282         0.9854            -13.7277       0.9867  14.0714        0.9865    0.2842       0.9986    0          
Bulk Carrier - 0.2150         0.8669    0.6109       0.2627    0.8181        0.1008    0.5034       0.6309 -10.6013       0.9562 
Chemical Tanker - 0.2325         0.8597 - 0.2382        0.6814    0.8251        0.1077    0.1242       0.9061    2.9903       0.9891 
Container   0.1911         0.8900    0.2035       0.7071    0.8585        0.0813  - 1.0022       0.5124 -10.2546       0.9572 
Fishing Vessel   7.2366         0.9898    8.4488       0.9492    2.2165        0.1609    0.6873       0.7968    2.6852       0.9953 
General Cargo   0.6444         0.6285    0.0908       0.8680    0.6304        0.2077    0.4105       0.7002  - 1.2999       0.9945 
LNG Tanker   9.5603         0.9948    0.7768       0.6474  - 0.6626        0.7299    2.7685       0.9882    0          
LPG Tanker - 0.8989         0.5896    0.4478       0.5596    1.9978        0.0184  - 0.7159       0.7061   12.0113       0.9556 
Passenger Vessel 11.5427         0.9884    6.3845       0.9607  12.6601        0.9731    8.6242       0.8118 -25.7902       0.9732 
Product Tanker   0.1199         0.9431    0.0334       0.9545    0.8981        0.1024    0.5576       0.6711    5.8267       0.9795 
Refrigerated Cargo 10.0652         0.9819 - 1.7875       0.1306    0.4000        0.5960  - 5.4423       0.7552 -11.6494       0.9791 
Research Vessel 10.9627           0.9845 - 8.7582       0.9847 -14.0351        0.9877    6.5227       0.9420 -23.9039       0.9592 
Ro-Ro    9.9474         0.9820    1.3033       0.1871    1.3739        0.2214  - 8.8686       0.8773  - 8.0247       0.9698 
Supply Ship - 5.0716         0.1027 - 0.4533       0.7619  - 2.1202        0.1054     6.6863       0.5886  - 7.2343       0.9887 
Tanker  - 0.9953         0.4695   0.5602       0.3432    0.9389        0.0938  - 5.1473       0.4732 -18.0568       0.9226 
Tug  - 1.1655         0.4512   0.3405       0.5891    1.6225        0.0113    0.4353       0.7385  - 3.9759       0.9886 
Vehicle Carrier   9.9469         0.9839 - 0.2133       0.8655  12.7187        0.9463    7.3448       0.9212  - 6.9618       0.9808 
Yacht  14.2853         0.9871   3.7535       0.9973    8.6225        0.9968  10.0602       0.9678    0          
Year Built   0.0591         0.0048 - 0.0127       0.1886    0.0077        0.3903  - 0.0031       0.8994    0.7542       0.0791 
Algeria   11.7467         0.9935   8.3327       0.9720 13.4434        0.9826  - 9.8070       0.9197    0          
Antigua   - 0.4135         0.8352 - 0.5396       0.5128    0.9514        0.1773    0.6513       0.6455  18.2036       0.9176 
Austria   10.0916         0.9969            -13.8914       0.9933  14.7486        0.9965    0.1983       0.9995    0.5220       0.9991 
Bahamas  - 0.3797         0.8444             - 0.0469       0.9553    1.1779        0.1342    0.4242       0.7874  - 3.2569       0.9840
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Table A-1. Continued 
              Outcome_____             Hostages_____                Stolen______         Ransom Paid____              Escape______                 
Independent/ 
Control Variable  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq   Estimate      Pr > ChiSq  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq   Estimate      Pr > ChiSq  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq 
Bahrain     8.5501         0.9978            -13.9910       0.9933  15.8333        0.9962  - 0.8704       0.9980  10.5882       0.9802 
Bangladesh  11.6945         0.9927 - 0.7101       0.7829  - 0.0474        0.9739  - 9.6431       0.9166    0          
Barbados  11.2905         0.9910 - 0.6768       0.6627    0.9499        0.4974  - 2.0349       0.9895  14.1202       0.9683 
Belgium   10.7894         0.9965            -13.3139       0.9936  15.0531        0.9964  - 5.8599       0.9866    2.9379       0.9962 
Belize   12.1159         0.9896    1.3212       0.3225  - 1.3205        0.2954  - 7.5294       0.9505  22.0066       0.9687  
Bermuda    7.4959         0.9945  19.0849       0.838 0 -14.5943        0.9931  11.4742       0.5655    0          
Bulgaria   11.5623         0.9962  12.3475       0.9967 -16.8947        0.9960  14.7403       0.9957    0          
Canary Islands    4.6349         0.9986    5.0807       0.9987  14.6568        0.9965  15.4434       0.9963    0          
Cayman Islands    8.8093         0.9947   3.3827       0.9966    9.5159        0.9965    9.1695       0.9540              -21.0030       0.9862 
China   10.9263         0.9862 - 1.5124       0.4169    1.9375        0.2416    2.4806       0.4993    0          
Comoros  11.1208         0.9901 - 1.2023       0.5749    1.7656        0.3911    7.7159       0.8634    8.1173       0.9890 
Croatia   11.0310         0.9938 - 0.9627       0.6060                13.6106        0.9878    2.8570       0.9876    0          
Cyprus   10.3438         0.9735 - 0.4017       0.6469    0.4990        0.5027  - 7.8145       0.8279    4.6616       0.9772 
Denmark  10.0516         0.9852 - 0.4111       0.7057    2.3375        0.0665    0.9675       0.6537    5.8895       0.9797 
Dominica  13.2733         0.9956            -14.4705       0.9930 13.9565        0.9957  - 0.0515       0.9999     0          
Egypt   10.7038         0.9944            -11.6029       0.9888 13.1225        0.9693    6.5218       0.9725  - 4.3478       0.9954 
Ethiopia     8.8733         0.9960    2.1315       0.9984 11.6859        0.9960  10.0548       0.9666    0          
France  10.0518         0.9694    0.2563       0.8641  - 0.1176        0.9461  - 3.1845       0.9173    4.7770       0.9954 
Germany  - 3.1353         0.1567  - 0.8783       0.4706    1.0161        0.3569    2.4748       0.2859    2.2211       0.9925  
Gibraltar     8.8517         0.9892  - 0.6356       0.6455  11.8934        0.9447    1.4888       0.6467    5.0409       0.9815  
Greece  10.5742         0.9827  - 0.5596       0.6429    0.4308        0.6451    5.0622       0.4867    7.6242       0.9621 
Honduras  11.9257         0.9950  16.7382       0.9937  - 1.5862        0.3146  - 0.2405       0.9992    0          
Hong Kong  10.7217         0.9624    0.4620       0.5838    1.1164        0.1372  - 0.6356       0.6701    0.7750       0.9966 
India  - 1.0112         0.5999  - 0.5754       0.5950  - 0.5102        0.5525    2.4488       0.9690  - 8.9289       0.9564 
Indonesia  12.0751         0.9763    0.2946       0.7704    0.6770        0.5232  - 0.9562       0.6248    1.1455       0.9972 
Iran   13.2369         0.9885  - 1.2015       0.6974  14.0485        0.9784    7.0689       0.7845    0          
Isle of Man 10.0754         0.9836  - 1.3961       0.2823    1.7541        0.1637  - 6.0815       0.9183 -10.8585       0.9561 
Italy  10.2806         0.9808  - 2.7739       0.0478  12.5141        0.9478  - 1.0317       0.5740    3.0785       0.9915 
Jamaica   11.7417         0.9965    3.7632       0.9982  11.0584         0.9974    6.9287       0.9846    0          
Japan    9.8114         0.9931    0.7121       0.6687    0.4995        0.7923  - 7.1403       0.9625    0          
Jordan  11.2849         0.9900  - 0.8499       0.5684  13.4749        0.9763    1.4013       0.5962    0          
Kenya    7.0596         0.9978    4.5676       0.9988  14.9722        0.9964  15.3179       0.9964    0          
Kiribati  11.1102         0.9920  - 0.0028       0.9992    0.0827        0.9542  - 9.3216       0.8929    0           
Kuwait   10.1469         0.9955           - 12.7199       0.9900              -15.2546        0.9937    9.2139       0.9655    0          
Liberia   - 0.7853         0.6519  - 0.3873       0.6191    0.1915        0.7686  - 0.0802       0.9537    9.0972       0.9548 
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Table A-1. Continued 
              Outcome_____             Hostages_____                Stolen______         Ransom Paid____              Escape______                 
Independent/ 
Control Variable  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq   Estimate      Pr > ChiSq  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq   Estimate      Pr > ChiSq  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq 
Libya   10.9212         0.9926            -13.8459       0.9848 12.0906        0.9885  - 1.3050       0.9939    0          
Lithuania  - 1.1518         0.9995    2.4260       0.1414    0.2791        0.8513    8.9521       0.6098    0          
Luxembourg    9.4687         0.9939    0.2463       0.8647  - 1.9536        0.1664    3.3524       0.9826  - 0.6494       0.9988 
Malaysia  13.3539         0.9625    0.3013       0.7313    0.9786        0.2497  - 0.0813       0.9574  - 1.7949       0.9940 
Malta    0.2844         0.8829  - 0.5633       0.4987    0.0097        0.9888  - 0.5158       0.6885  14.5388       0.9332 
Marshall Islands  - 1.2327         0.4945  - 0.1303       0.8698    0.6908        0.3139    0.0321       0.9815    9.1147       0.9581 
Mongolia  12.4912         0.9900  - 1.4471       0.4869 13.4381        0.9761  - 9.5800       0.9130    0          
Netherlands  - 3.3671         0.0728  - 0.4311       0.6893  -0.2743        0.7467    1.5939       0.6508  10.8266       0.9581 
Nigeria    9.6397         0.9961  16.0933       0.9939  -2.2382        0.1610  21.8112       0.9632  10.2771       0.9819 
North Korea 12.1855         0.9809    7.2972       0.9283  -0.9485        0.5687  - 0.8984       0.6983    0          
Norway   - 1.3745         0.4869 - 0.9582       0.3686    0.0338        0.9674  - 5.4895       0.8918  17.9928       0.9203 
Pakistan   11.0564         0.9873    3.8474       0.9962    8.3123        0.9953    7.0784       0.9571  - 7.6363       0.9728 
Panama   - 1.0121         0.5303 - 0.8336       0.2707    0.4436        0.4766  - 1.6789       0.1304    7.4644       0.9630 
Philippines  10.7575         0.9889 - 2.1345       0.2411  -1.5886        0.2450  - 9.6939       0.8993    0          
Portugal    8.9856         0.9963   0.3617       0.8210 14.9481        0.9949  10.4315       0.6189    0          
Qatar   11.0531         0.9946            -12.6498       0.9897 13.8817        0.9869    5.0002       0.9798    0          
Russia     9.3142         0.9962             10.3618       0.9186 10.7934        0.9802  - 8.5028       0.9713    0          
Saudi Arabia  10.4857         0.9953             14.8731       0.9898  -1.2872        0.4183    5.8346       0.8489    0          
Seychelles    6.3921         0.9967            -12.2854       0.9907 13.5144        0.9848  - 4.7591       0.9787    0          
Sierra Leone    9.4984         0.9966    5.0645       0.9966 10.8194        0.9964    6.1601       0.9803  - 5.1207       0.9980 
Singapore  - 0.8596         0.6300 - 0.0829       0.9161    0.0917        0.8904  - 0.2136       0.8872  - 2.0252       0.9901 
South Korea  10.7268         0.9891    2.1277       0.1391 12.4063        0.9730    1.7986       0.9847    0          
Spain     2.9395         0.9981 - 1.0319       0.9949 11.1449        0.9793    9.4236       0.8968    0          
St. Kitt/Nevis  12.4769         0.9800 - 0.6617       0.5739    0.6705        0.5282    0.2927       0.8580  16.6015       0.9628 
St. Vincent  - 0.2243         0.9072 - 2.1507       0.0489  -0.0318        0.9690  - 0.5215       0.6944    1.5462       0.9985 
Switzerland    8.4071         0.9957   0.2562       0.8639 15.7132        0.9933  - 7.8635       0.9631  - 7.6315       0.9820 
Taiwan   11.6096         0.9964   3.4355       0.9983    9.4284        0.9978    7.1299       0.9840    4.3973       0.9975 
Thailand   10.9286         0.9837   0.5787       0.6191    0.0013        0.9989  - 2.2144       0.2527    1.1068       0.9975 
Togo  11.6126         0.9919    7.8364       0.9486 13.6445        0.9765    7.9479       0.8609    0          
Turkey   11.4920         0.9806 - 1.1451       0.3770    0.2508        0.8241    1.0145       0.7255  22.1361       0.9439 
Tuvalu   11.6368         0.9898 - 0.1945       0.8844    0.4481        0.7330    1.8705       0.9879  17.9844       0.9693 
UAE   11.7362         0.9889   7.8910       0.9342 14.0534        0.9616  13.5045       0.1975 -14.8680       0.9877 
UK   10.1428         0.9827 - 0.6477       0.5829    0.1901        0.8348  - 0.6450       0.7267  10.1806       0.9783 
Ukraine   10.8149         0.9970  16.6552       0.9956 16.0159        0.9962  - 7.9640       0.9818  15.0440       0.9755 
USA     9.9591         0.9540 - 1.7838       0.1344    1.1090        0.3027  - 4.2887       0.7255    0          
Vanuatu     9.6240         0.9932   1.3977       0.3335 11.8755        0.9586  - 6.6998       0.9566  22.8780       0.9453
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Table A-1. Continued 
              Outcome_____             Hostages_____                Stolen______         Ransom Paid____              Escape______                 
Independent/ 
Control Variable  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq   Estimate      Pr > ChiSq  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq   Estimate      Pr > ChiSq  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq 
Vietnam     9.9541         0.9903   0.6013       0.5933    0.6332        0.6282  - 6.1409       0.9348    0          
Malacca  - 0.8738         0.6131 - 1.1325       0.3518  -0.8731        0.5593    3.9782       0.1087  - 5.3800       0.8574 
Southeast Asia   2.6381         0.0663 - 1.0521       0.1900  -0.3850        0.7356  - 9.7233       0.5549    5.9336       0.8810 
Far East    1.8551         0.2060 - 0.6724       0.4144  -0.1754        0.8807  - 9.3990       0.7335 -10.7223       0.7198 
Indian    1.7883         0.1959 - 2.1708       0.0104    0.4523        0.6951  -10.0716       0.7075  - 1.1142       0.9695 
Americas    3.8318         0.0305 - 0.4725       0.5595    0.0068        0.9953 -14.5098       0.6222    1.8003       0.9811 
Somalia    1.3499         0.3176 - 0.9273       0.3237  -3.3482        0.0078  - 0.1186       0.9521  - 5.2310       0.9702 
Aden    2.1133         0.1254   0.4359       0.6699  -2.8270        0.0284    0.7073       0.7211    3.9582       0.9802 
Africa    4.0188         0.0135 - 0.8432       0.2891  -0.0658        0.9539  - 0.5860       0.7770    0.8305       0.9799
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Table A-2. Complete results for all variables from Model B  
 
              Outcome_____             Hostages_____                Stolen______         Ransom Paid____              Escape______                 
Independent/ 
Control Variable  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq   Estimate      Pr > ChiSq  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq   Estimate      Pr > ChiSq  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq 
Cooperation - 2.1430       0.0002  - 0.1138        0.5597    0.1928        0.3032  - 0.1857       0.7876  - 9.8169       0.4340  
Best Practice - 0.0459       0.9361  - 0.7533        0.0002  - 1.3963       < .0001  - 0.1583       0.8472  - 0.4027       0.9761 
 
Berthed  - 0.6260       0.5109  - 0.7328        0.0523  - 0.2954        0.3488  - 9.6163       0.7397    6.9831       0.8270 
Attempted    2.3026       0.0135 -16.8542        0.8489 -25.1462        0.8866 -12.0239       0.4121    3.9612       0.9375 
Fired Upon    1.9932       0.0225 -18.6879        0.8415 -24.3404        0.8957 -12.9658       0.4059  15.1066       0.9347 
Hijacked  - 0.6691       0.4337     3.1086        <.0001    1.5380        0.0054    3.9646       <.0001    7.8355       0.9613 
Barge  12.5219       0.9859 -13.7018        0.9866  14.1578        0.9860    1.2235       0.9946    0  
Bulk  - 0.4550       0.7320     0.6332        0.2408    0.8024        0.1077    0.4301       0.6795 -11.8171       0.9540 
Chemical  - 0.6170       0.6485  - 0.2609        0.6502    0.7318        0.1516  - 0.0942       0.9280  - 1.7205       0.9939 
Container - 0.0407       0.9775    0.1739        0.7456    0.7076        0.1491  - 1.2855       0.3825  - 4.7927       0.9816 
Fishing     6.7045       0.9891    8.2322        0.9502    1.9041        0.2365    1.8648       0.3854  - 7.1775       0.9897 
General Cargo    0.1110       0.9353    0.0767        0.8871    0.5713        0.2545    0.0599       0.9550 -11.8407       0.9544 
LNG     9.1344       0.9950     0.8374        0.6220  - 0.5824        0.7547    2.1810       0.9905    0  
LPG  - 1.1780        0.4819    0.4472        0.5582    1.8671        0.0278  - 0.8188       0.6674    5.4710       0.9808  
Passenger 10.3633        0.9868    6.6294        0.9542  13.2135        0.9678    8.1952       0.6854  - 8.4099       0.9929 
Product Tanker - 0.1174       0.9440    0.0264        0.9638    0.8008        0.1432    0.0074       0.9956  - 5.4557       0.9793 
Refrigerated Cargo    9.8376       0.9821  - 1.7469        0.1382    0.3930        0.5980  - 5.4212       0.7211  - 4.0369       0.9920 
Research Vessel 10.3276       0.9837  - 8.6762        0.9846 -14.1363        0.9877    4.8622       0.9622 -21.4463       0.9626 
Ro-Ro     9.5907       0.9831    1.2675        0.1909    1.1028        0.3151 -10.3958       0.8355 -10.2723       0.9651 
Supply Ship - 6.2978       0.0304  - 0.5087        0.7281  - 2.2395        0.0784    6.7847       0.6621 -15.2653       0.9785 
Tanker  - 1.2255       0.3831    0.5683        0.3326    0.8714        0.1183  - 5.3828       0.4794 -15.9429       0.9379 
Tug  - 1.6623       0.2988    0.3103        0.6009    1.6151        0.0107    0.3925       0.7592  - 7.9299       0.9786 
Vehicle    9.8846       0.9844  - 0.2012        0.8728  12.5693        0.9416    5.3279       0.9292  - 5.7424       0.9869 
Yacht  12.7025       0.9901    3.3050        0.9975    8.7108        0.9969    3.4063       0.9885    0  
Built    0.0540       0.0053  - 0.0119        0.2199    0.0091        0.3066  - 0.0040       0.8636    0.2760       0.6785 
Algeria   12.5841       0.9932    8.3385        0.9721 13.4639        0.9833  - 9.8240       0.9196    0  
Antigua    0.4190       0.8190  - 0.5042        0.5429    1.0481        0.1368    0.9395       0.4872    2.6551       0.9904 
Austria   11.2385       0.9965 -13.9044        0.9933  14.8027        0.9965    1.2343       0.9970    6.8588       0.9868 
Bahamas    0.1904       0.9104  - 0.0592        0.9438    1.0189        0.1860    0.3959       0.7921  - 3.3285       0.9875 
Bahrain     9.3321       0.9975 -13.9558        0.9933  15.6984        0.9963  - 2.3293       0.9948    2.7211       0.9954 
Bangladesh  10.6723       0.9968  - 0.7054        0.7866  - 0.1142        0.9365  - 9.6326       0.9164    0 
Barbados  11.8944       0.9898  - 0.6603        0.6639  - 0.6439        0.6413  - 6.0420       0.9670  14.6040       0.9665 
Belgium   10.6723       0.9968 -13.7781        0.9934  14.2580        0.9966  - 7.4181       0.9818    2.6860       0.9963 
Belize   12.1803       0.9900    1.2654        0.3389  - 1.4937        0.2294  - 5.2952       0.9488    8.1038       0.9889 
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Table A-2. Continued 
 
              Outcome_____             Hostages_____                Stolen______         Ransom Paid____              Escape______                 
Independent/ 
Control Variable  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq   Estimate      Pr > ChiSq  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq   Estimate      Pr > ChiSq  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq 
Bermuda    6.5811       0.9948   18.8278        0.8404 -14.6699        0.9930  11.0055       0.5374    0  
Bulgaria   12.3734       0.9959  12.2447        0.9968 -17.3082        0.9959  14.6889       0.9956    0  
Canary Islands    5.7451       0.9982    5.3059        0.9986  14.8688        0.9965  14.1652       0.9966    0  
Cayman Islands    9.7466       0.9943    3.3551        0.9966    9.7259        0.9950    4.8651       0.9763 -14.5739       0.9896 
China   11.3107       0.9859  - 1.4817        0.4351    1.9780        0.2589    1.8125       0.5207    0  
Comoros  12.1826       0.9896  - 1.3843        0.4933    1.2429        0.4942    6.9206       0.8216    4.1967       0.9950 
Croatia   11.9261       0.9933    0.9677        0.6062  13.0032        0.9847    2.5338       0.9891     0  
Cyprus   10.9228       0.9723  - 0.3441        0.6959    0.5038        0.4932  - 7.8264       0.8274  - 8.8361       0.9670 
Denmark  11.0776       0.9836  - 0.4048        0.7087    2.1125        0.0939    1.1122       0.5812  - 1.2203       0.9964 
Dominica 14.2392         0.9952 -14.4463        0.9930  13.9962        0.9967    0.6535       0.9985    0  
Egypt   11.0317       0.9944 -11.9741        0.9885  12.1769        0.9755    3.4708       0.9840  - 8.4699       0.9897 
Ethiopia     9.4214       0.9959    1.4745        0.9989  10.7815        0.9963    6.0063       0.9786    0  
France  10.1766       0.9607    0.3501        0.8156    0.1021        0.9551  - 2.7210       0.8772  - 7.5612       0.9935 
Germany  - 2.3718       0.2270  - 0.8190        0.5025    1.1058        0.3218    2.4264       0.8274  - 0.0015       1.000 
Gibraltar     9.7238       0.9983  - 0.8315        0.5425  11.7785        0.9523    0.7909       0.7389    3.7622       0.9891 
Greece  11.4748       0.9808  - 0.5054        0.6768    0.3849        0.6794    5.2010       0.4987    5.8094       0.9819 
Honduras  12.6715       0.9946  16.7355        0.9937  - 1.4631        0.3531    0.9753       0.9970    0  
Hong Kong  11.2421       0.9625    0.4793        0.5699    0.8995        0.2250  - 1.0773       0.4553    3.6526       0.9874  
India  - 0.4492       0.7956  - 0.5723        0.5984  - 0.5429        0.5233    2.0646       0.9743  - 8.8742       0.9670 
Indonesia  11.7159       0.9791    0.3264        0.7468    0.7274        0.4869  - 0.8634       0.6548  - 8.3876       0.9850 
Iran   13.2468       0.9900  - 1.1866        0.6865  13.7842        0.9780    5.9739       0.8281    0  
Isle of Man 10.9906       0.9825  - 1.3563        0.2976    1.5559        0.2056  - 5.2317       0.9317 -10.3662       0.9666 
Italy  11.1451       0.9792  - 2.7922        0.0481  12.4238        0.9464  - 1.1015       0.5469 -12.8545       0.9622 
Jamaica   12.1891       0.9965     3.1341        0.9985  10.0005        0.9976    4.0008       0.9905    0  
Japan  10.7511       0.9922     0.7043        0.6732    0.3506        0.8482  - 5.9384       0.9698    0  
Jordan  12.0506       0.9892  - 0.8965        0.5357  13.6843        0.9811    1.5249       0.5516    0  
Kenya    7.9594       0.9975     4.8196        0.9987  15.2428        0.9964  13.9997       0.9966    0  
Kiribati  12.1892       0.9918     0.0688        0.9795  - 0.0766        0.9583 -11.2925       0.8662    0  
Kuwait   11.7969       0.9943 -12.6706        0.9900 -15.3353        0.9963    7.1820       0.9773    0  
Liberia   - 0.0971       0.9484  - 0.3929        0.6154    0.0979        0.8791    0.0419       0.9748    4.7109       0.9824 
Libya   11.7531       0.9924 -13.8913        0.9848  11.7827        0.9869  - 1.3893       0.9935    0  
Lithuania  - 0.5538       0.9997     2.4006        0.1458    0.2464        0.8665    8.1651       0.5926    0  
Luxembourg    9.6674       0.9942     0.1174        0.9357  - 2.0111        0.1468    2.6411       0.9885 -17.3227       0.9673 
Malaysia  14.7953       0.9546     0.3365        0.7023    0.9919        0.2400  - 0.3947       0.7873  - 9.5847       0.9716 
Malta    0.7199       0.6722  - 0.5645        0.5006  - 0.0766        0.8860  - 0.7739       0.5277    8.5896       0.9694 
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Table A-2. Continued 
 
              Outcome_____             Hostages_____                Stolen______         Ransom Paid____              Escape______                 
Independent/ 
Control Variable  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq   Estimate      Pr > ChiSq  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq   Estimate      Pr > ChiSq  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq 
Marshall Islands  - 0.5686       0.7162  - 0.1818        0.8198    0.4972        0.4633    0.0485       0.9708    0.3011       0.9988 
Mongolia  12.3266       0.9909  - 1.5093        0.4606  13.7005        0.9808  - 9.5902       0.9129    0  
Netherlands  - 2.5151       0.1211  - 0.4090        0.7056  - 0.3369        0.6902    1.1571       0.6798     9.7157       0.9676 
Nigeria  10.2735       0.9959  16.1058        0.9939  - 2.1654        0.1761  21.4521       9.9633  - 6.8862       0.9888 
 North Korea 12.4413       0.9825    7.0235        0.9359  - 1.4358        0.3485  - 1.9038       0.2995    0  
 Norway   - 1.0069       0.5731  - 0.9385        0.3760  - 0.1373        0.8656  - 5.5079       0.9035    3.1277       0.9888 
Pakistan   10.9751       0.9883    3.3575        0.9966    8.5091        0.9956    2.4455       0.9841    4.4859       0.9863 
Panama  - 0.2522       0.8531  - 0.8166        0.2823    0.3731        0.5449  - 1.5804       0.1355  - 2.3947       0.9910 
Philippines 11.4742       0.9883   - 2.2115        0.2295  - 1.6519        0.2203  - 9.6892       0.8983    0  
Portugal  10.0718       0.9958     0.3701        0.8171  15.0234        0.9949    9.9936       0.6510    0  
Qatar   11.8626       0.9943 -12.5846        0.9900  13.4244        0.9845    3.3495       0.9874    0  
Russia   10.2268       0.9958  10.3466        0.9191  10.9299        0.9808  - 6.9412       0.9768    0  
Saudi Arabia  11.1921       0.9950  14.9372        0.9898  - 1.3015        0.4071    5.7811       0.8313     0  
Seychelles    7.4778       0.9963 -12.2362        0.9909  13.0649        0.9827  - 6.1647       0.9715    0  
Sierra Leone  10.9402       0.9958     5.0744        0.9966  10.8950        0.9963    5.0958       0.9839  - 9.9430       0.9924 
Singapore  - 0.1048       0.9458  - 0.0391        0.9605    0.0815        0.9014  - 0.2506       0.8620  - 6.6039       0.9753 
South Korea  11.4486       0.9886    2.1508        0.1360  12.1400        0.9698    2.4830       0.9798    0  
Spain     3.7663       0.9974  - 0.8639        0.9957  11.6688        0.9814    5.4717       0.8513    0  
St. Kitt/Nevis  12.8643       0.9809  - 0.7147        0.5509    0.4775        0.6463    0.0810       0.9592  - 0.6746       0.9986 
St. Vincent    0.1635       0.9239  - 2.2097        0.0470  - 0.0714        0.9297  - 0.7128       0.5755  - 3.5086       0.9967 
Switzerland    9.3899       0.9952    0.2617        0.8617  15.5694        0.9934  - 7.6443       0.9665  - 1.3303       0.9972 
Taiwan   11.8977       0.9966    2.8045        0.9987    8.7264        0.9979    5.5445       0.9869 -13.2749     0.9838 
Thailand   11.5200       0.9825    0.6694        0.5687    0.2227        0.8213  - 1.7138       0.3494    1.9357       0.9962 
Togo   12.5662       0.9914    7.7678        0.9472  13.5505        0.9761    7.5409       0.8117    0  
Turkey   11.9257       0.9816  - 1.1747        0.3688    0.1523        0.8955    0.1064       0.9622    2.0700       0.9956 
Tuvalu   11.7971       0.9900   - 0.2464        0.8536    0.3960        0.7651    1.5297       0.9905  - 5.0846       0.9922 
UAE   11.9935       0.9894    7.5031        0.9377  13.1186        0.9668  10.0474       0.3712  - 4.8003       0.9954 
UK   10.9832       0.9813  - 0.6714        0.5688  - 0.0143        0.9871  - 0.7177       0.6885  - 8.8240       0.9859 
Ukraine   11.7974       0.9966  16.6649        0.9956  15.7844        0.9962  - 8.0294       0.9818  10.5208       0.9809 
USA   10.1345       0.9419  - 1.8384        0.1307    1.0175        0.3456  - 4.8835       0.7521    0  
Vanuatu     9.9287       0.9930    1.2511        0.3874  11.8061        0.9638  - 6.5807       0.9600  - 3.4964       0.9924 
Vietnam   19.7956       0.9895    0.6193        0.5835    0.6008        0.6434  - 5.1249       0.9480    0  
Malacca  - 0.5760       0.7460  -1.1568        0.3424  - 0.9230        0.5343    3.6424       0.1627  - 3.7156       0.9779 
Southeast Asia   2.8370       0.0256  -1.0826        0.1774  - 0.5040        0.6573  - 9.1977       0.5573    9.5173       0.9433 
Far East    2.0225       0.1763  -0.7270        0.3774  - 0.2509        0.8294    0.1274       0.7541  - 5.0788       0.9691 
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Table A-2. Continued 
 
              Outcome_____             Hostages_____                Stolen______         Ransom Paid____              Escape______                 
Independent/ 
Control Variable  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq   Estimate      Pr > ChiSq  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq   Estimate      Pr > ChiSq  Estimate      Pr > ChiSq 
Indian    2.0573       0.1406  -2.2229        0.0086    0.2755        0.8104  - 9.6324       0.6749    2.3775       0.9855 
Americas    3.6793       0.0340  -0.5247        0.5163  - 0.1901        0.8692 -12.6128       0.6814  16.6643       0.9098  
Somalia    0.5974       0.6579  -0.9210        0.3126  - 3.1751        0.0099  - 0.3340       0.8771  - 4.5939       0.9806 
Aden    1.4806       0.2852   0.5739        0.5694  - 2.5105        0.0474    0.6561       0.7630    4.2075       0.9811 
Africa    4.1288       0.0122  -0.8595        0.2796  - 0.1289        0.9095  - 0.3914       0.8611    3.5747       0.9784
31 
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